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The essence of the legal origin hypothesis is that a country with an English legal 
origin provides better investor and creditor protection and experiences greater 
financial  development;  financial  institutions  and  stock  markets  flourish,  the 
general public participate more in financing investment projects of companies 
and  so  shareholding  is  less  concentrated.  The  present  paper  examines  this 
hypothesis on the basis of a cross-country study of 85 countries. We find no 
evidence of more dispersed share ownership in the English law countries than in 
other countries with different legal origins irrespective of whether we adjust for 
the existence of transitional economies and less developed countries present in 
the sample.  Using three indicators of development of banking and other credit 
institutions and four indicators of stock market developments, we also find no 
evidence of more developed financial systems in the English law countries. As 
expected, there is some evidence of lower financial development in the less 
developed countries and transitional countries. It is not the English law heritage 
but the security of persons and goods that appears to explain the cross-country 
variations in financial development. 
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1. Introduction 
In  a  seminal  work  on  corporate  governance,  La  Porta,  Lopez  de  Silanes, 
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1998)  -  henceforth  ‘LLSV’-  observed  that  the  legal 
environment  is  a  significant  factor  in  explaining  financial  growth  and 
development in different countries. It was further observed that a country with 
an  English  legal  origin  provides  better  investor  and  creditor  protection  and 
experiences  greater  financial  development;  financial  institutions  and  stock 
markets tend to flourish and the general public participate more in financing 
investment projects of companies; so shareholding is less concentrated (see also 
Djankov et al., 2005).  
 
Several authors have since studied the links between financial development and 
legal origin (see, for e.g., Beck et al., 2003) or added a limited time dimension 
to the existing dataset and examined the determinants of investor protection 
(see, for example, Pagano and Volpin, 2006). Embedded in the literature on 
legal  origin  is  the  general  perception  that  legal  change  is  likely  to be  more 
frequent  and  the  legal  system  as  a  whole  more  adaptable  to  changing 
environments in an English common law system (which originated in the UK 
and spread to the USA and other countries) than in other systems (the different 
types of civil law system that originated in France and Germany spreading to 
developing countries often through colonisation and conquest).  
 
The LLSV legal origin hypothesis has generated much controversy. On the one 
hand, there is some ambiguity concerning the mechanism through which better 
shareholder  protection  is  expected  to  affect  share  ownership  dispersion.  For 
instance,  more  minority  shareholder  protection  might  make  small  investors 
more comfortable with firms controlled by large shareholders facilitating listing 
of firms with concentrated ownership (for German experience see Edwards and 
Weichenrieder,  2004  and  for  French  history  of  corporate  ownership  see 
Murphy, 2004). 
 
On  the  other  hand,  there  were  many  “great  reversals”  in  outcomes,  which 
contradicted the theory.  As Rajan and Zingales (2003) showed France had a 
more developed capital market than the US before World War One, while in 
more recent decades it has been the other way round.  This is contrary to the 
legal origin theory because these origins do not change over time. The Rajan-
Zingales conclusion was questioned by Sylla (2006) and La Porta et al (2008) 
but Musacchio (2008) has provided some new evidence in favour of Rajan-
Zingales (2003) conclusion.  
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Recently, a detailed dataset on shareholder protection has been prepared for five 
countries (France, Germany, UK, USA and India) over the period, 1970-2005 
by legal scholars at Cambridge (see Lele and Siems, 2007). A detailed analysis 
of  this  dataset  questions  both  aspects  of  the  legal  origin  hypothesis  –  the 
existence of better investor protection in English legal origin countries leading 
to dispersed shareholding and the consequent greater financial development in 
these countries (Fagernas et al., 2008 and Sarkar, 2007). 
 
An alternative to the LLSV legal origin hypothesis has been provided by Roe 
and  Seigel  (2008).  In  their  view,  political  instability  impedes  financial 
development  and  is  a  primary  determinant  of  differences  in  financial 
development around the world. 
 
Last,  but  not  least,  some  scholars  of  comparative  law  argue  that  the 
classification of countries by reference to legal origins is not always clear and 
point out that in reality most legal systems are hybrids. For instance, South 
African law derives from both civil law and common law traditions; Japanese 
company law used to be based on the German model but, since the 1950s, has 
been heavily influenced by US law; Swiss company law is influenced by the 
UK legal system and, due to the influence of the EU, UK law itself has become 
more ‘continental’ (Siems, 2007, 2008 and Armour et al., 2007). 
 
In this examination of the LLSV proposition, we set aside the above mentioned 
concerns  about  the  existence  of  hybrid  legal  systems  and  assume  that  the 
countries  can  be  rigorously  classified  into  two  groups  on  the  basis  of  legal 
origins, namely English (common law) and non-English (civil law). We then 
examine  whether  English  legal  origin  countries  have  more  dispersed  share 
ownership and are more financially developed. We have data for 85 countries 
and we control for the existence of transitional economies and less developed 
countries in the sample. The data source and methodology are presented in the 
next section along with the findings. The study is summarised and concluding 
observations are made in the final section. 
 
2. The Present Study 
From  the  database  called    “Profils  Institutionnels”  (available  on  line: 
http://www.cepii.fr/ProfilsInstitutionnelsDatabase.htm) built by the researchers 
at the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry (MINEFE) and 
the French Development Agency (AFD) based on a survey in 85 countries
1 we 
can obtain information about the extent of  dispersion of share ownership in 
these countries in 2006. The variable (B 708) assumes the value 0 if the type of 
individual  shareholder  (other  than  institutional,  family  and  government 
shareholders)  does  not  exist  -  if  it  exists,  it  assumes  the  value  1,  2,  3,  4   3
depending on whether its importance is very low to very high.  These data are 
ordinal rather than cardinal (a country scored 4 for dispersed share ownership 
cannot be said to have a dispersion twice of that of a country scored at 2) so 
ordered logit and probit regression techniques are used. STATA and LIMDEP 
are two well-known computer programmes that can be used to estimate models 
using this kind of data; we used STATA. 
 
In our sample, 22 countries can be categorised as English law group countries
2 
and we assigned the value 1 to each of these countries and zero to the other 63 
countries  (the  variable  ENG).  Using  the  ordered  logit  and  probit  regression 
technique,  we  examined  whether  English  law  group  countries  had  more 
dispersed share ownership than the rest. We have found no significant evidence 
in support of the proposition. Use of dummies for the less developed countries 
(LDCs) and transitional countries – with DUMLDC  assuming a value 1 for the 
non-OECD countries (including also current members, Mexico and Korea), and 
DUMTR having a value 1 for the transitional countries – China and other ex-
socialist countries (and zero otherwise) does not change our conclusion.  Only 
the dummy for the LDCs (DUMLDC) is negative and significant implying less 
dispersed share ownership in these countries (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: English Law Origin and Dispersed Share Ownership: Regression 
Analysis 
 
A.  Ordered Logit regression  
 
ENG  0.542  0.733  0.812  0.69  
DUMTR    0.768      -0.732 
DUMLDC      -1.566*  -1.931* 
Pseudo R
2         0.006  0.016 
 
0.066  0.071 
 
B.  Ordered Probit regression  
 
ENG  0.304   0.39  0.451  0 .36  
DUMTR    0.941    -0.522 
DUMLDC      -0.88*  -1.135* 
Pseudo R
2         0.006  0.011  0.062  0.069 
         
C.  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression 
 
ENG      0.23  1.43 
DUMTR        1.73 
LPCYPPP      0.13*  0.13* 
Intercept      0.77  0.71 
 R
2             0.13  0.16 
 
* Significant at 1 percent level; other estimates are not significant even at 5 percent level. 
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To check the robustness of the result, we have used the initial GDP per capita 
(averaged over the period 1995-2001) measured in internationally comparable 
purchasing power parity constant dollars
3 (in natural logs, LPCYPPP) instead of 
the dummy for LDCs (DUMLDC).
4  Because of this cardinal variable, logit and 
probit models cannot be used. So we have used OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
with  (heteroschedasticity  consistent)  robust  standard  errors.  Our  basic 
conclusion does not change. We observe that the higher the GDP per capita, the 
more dispersed is the share ownership (consistent with our earlier findings of a 
significant and negative coefficient of DUMLDC). 
 
Next, we examine whether English law group countries tend to have a more 
developed financial market. From the World Bank data on Financial Structure 
Dataset, we obtained financial development indicators for 78 countries out of 85 
country-sample  of  MINEFE-AFD  dataset:  Private  Credit  by  Deposit  Money 
Banks  /  GDP  (PCRY),  Private  Credit  by  Deposit  Money  Banks  and  Other 
Financial Institutions / GDP (PCRFY), Bank Deposits / GDP (BDY).  
 
The following regression was estimated: 
 
Log Y = a + b.ENG +c.DUMTR + d.DUMLDC (or LPCYPPP) 
 
where Y is the alternative series on financial development indicators, such as 
BDY,  averaged over the five year period 2001-2005. 
 
Our  cross-country  regression  analysis  (see  Table  2)  shows  no  statistically 
significant evidence of a more developed financial market in English law group 
countries, even  
after  taking  into  account  the  fact  that  our  sample  includes  many  LDCs  and 
transitional countries (with the use of dummies, DUMLDC and DUMTR).  
 
From the same World Bank source (Financial Structure Dataset), we collected 
data for 66 countries (out of 85) regarding stock market development indicators: 
Stock  Market  Capitalization/GDP  (MKY),  Stock  Market  Total  Value 
Traded/GDP (VTRY), Stock Market Turnover Ratio (TURN).  From the World 
Bank  data  on  World  Development  Indicators,  we  calculated  the  number  of 
domestic  companies  listed  in  the  national  stock  market  as  a  ratio  of  total 
population for 64 countries (LIST). Following the same regression analysis of 
cross-country averages (over the period 2001-2005) we find no evidence of a 
higher stock market development in the English law group countries.  In all the 
cases the dummies for the LDCs and transitional economies are negative and 
significant, implying a less financial development in these countries compared 
to the other countries.   5
Replacing the LDC dummy by GDP per capita (LPCYPPP) does not change the 
basic  conclusion.  Interestingly,  we  find  no  significant  relationship  between 
GDP  per  capita  and  stock  market  development  indicators  in  contrast  to  the 
positive  relationship  observed  between  GDP  per  capita  and  financial 
development  indicators  such  as  the  bank  deposit-GDP  ratio  (BDY,  PCRY, 
PCRFY).  It hints at a positive relationship between the development of banking 
and other financial institutions (other than the stock market) and GDP.  It is 
beyond the scope of the present study to explore it further; it is the subject 
matter of a rapidly growing literature (see for example Bekaert, 2005; Levine, 
2001 & 2003; Levine and Zervos, 1998). 
 
Table 2: English Law Origin and Financial Development, 2001-2005: 
Cross-Country Regression Analysis 
 





BDY  BDY  PCRY  PCRY  PCRFY  PCRFY 
ENG  0 .339   0.39  0.358    0.42  0.439   0.51 
DUMTR  -1.22**  -0.59*  -1.223**    -0.27  -1.334**  -0.34 
DUMLDC  -0.851**    -1.283**    -1.323**   
LPCYPPP    0.11*    0.14*    0.13* 
a  -0.463**  -2.01**  -0.322  -2.49**  -0.211  -2.28 
Adj. R
2         0.262  0.18  0.352  0.17  0.356  0.15 
 





MKPY  MKPY  VTRDY  VTRD
Y 
TURN  TURN  LIST  LIST 
ENG    0.053  0.08    0.172  0.16  0.149  0.11   0.249  0.19 
DUMTR  -1.48**  -0.87  -2.442**  -0.75  0.951**  0.14  -0.836  0.01 
DUMLDC  -0.899**    -2.466**    -1.589**    -1.241**   
LPCYPPP    0.07    0.12    0.07    0.12 
a  -0.469**  -1.68**  -0.674*  -3.47**  -0.213  -1.89**  -10.974**  -12.94** 
Adj. R
2          0.152  0.09   0.224  0.04  0.236  0.02  0.13  0.06 
 
*  Significant at 5 percent level (based on robust SE).  
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Information on internal public security of these countries (in a scale of 1 to 4 – 
very  low  to  very  high)  was  extracted  from  the  MINEFE-AFD  dataset.  This 
variable, A200, has five factors: 
 
1. security of persons and goods, A2000: 
2. conflicts of ethnic, religious, regional nature, A2001; 
3. violent actions by underground political organizations, A2002; 
4. organized criminal activity (drug-trafficking, arms-trafficking), A2003, and 
5. violent social conflicts, A2004. 
 
These are aggregated into a single variable, A200 by the weighted average (with 
the weight of a factor being its standard deviation measuring variations of that 
factor across the countries). 
 
Including the aggregate variable (A200) in our regression, the following model 
was estimated: 
 
Log Y = a + b.ENG +c.DUMTR + d.DUMLDC (or LPCYPPP) + e.A200 
 
where Y is the alternative series on financial development indicators such as 
BDY etc (average over the period 2001-2005).  
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Table 3: Internal Public Security, English Legal Origin and Financial 
Development, 2001-2005: Cross-Country Analysis 
 





BDY  BDY  PCRY   PCRY  PCRFY  PCRFY 
A200  0.211*  0.28*  0.25*  0.38  0.181  0.33* 
ENG  0 .32  0.37*  0.33  0.4  0.424  0.49 
DUMTR  -1.191**  -0.67  -1.18**    -0.36  -1.304**  -0.42 
DUMLDC  -0.728**  -  -1.136**  -  -1.218**  - 
LPCYPPP  -  0.08  -  0.11*  -  0.09 
a  -1.174**    -1.174*  -3.31*  -0.822  -3* 
Adj. R
2         0.129    0.384  0.27  0.37  0.23 
 





MKPY  MKPY  VTRDY  VTRDY  TURN  TURN  LIST  LIST 
A200  0.315  0.47*  0.226  0.7*  -0.062  0.26  0.598**  0.69** 
ENG    -0.027  -0.001    0.115  0.04  0.165  0.07   0.131  0.11 
DUMTR  -1.43**  -1.01  -2.406**  -0.97  -0.961**  0.06  -0.827  -0.27 
DUMLDC  -0.676*  -  -2.306**  -  -1.634**  -  -0.878*  - 
LPCYPPP    0.02    0.05    0.04    0.06 
a  -1.509  -2.56**  -1.421  -4.79**  -0.008  -2.37**  -12.89**  -
14.35** 
Adj. R
2          0.18  0.16   0.23  0.08  0.24    0.21  0.17 
 
*  Significant at 5 percent level (based on robust SE).  
**  Significant at 1 percent level (based on robust SE).  
 
    
We find some support of the Roe-Siegel (2008) hypothesis for some (not all) of 
the  indicators  of  financial  development.  Banking  sector  developments,  as 
measured by bank deposits relative to GDP (BDY), and private credit by banks 
relative to GDP (PCRY) and also stock market developments as measured by 
the number of listed domestic companies relative to total population (LIST) 
suggest that the greater internal security of a country, the more developed is the 
financial  system.  But  in  no  case  do  we  find  support  for  the  legal  origin 
hypothesis (see Table 3). 
 
In  further  analysis  we  considered  all  the  five  elements  making  up  A200 
separately. Variables A2001 and A2002 have the highest variations across the 
countries and are also highly correlated.  Neither of these factors is significantly 
related  to  cross-country  variations  in  financial  development.  Violent  social 
conflict (A2004) is significantly related to the cross-country variations in bank   8
deposits (the lower the conflict - the higher is the value of A2004 - the higher is 
BDGDP) while the extent of organised criminal activity (A2003) is associated 
with the cross-country variations in bank credit and stock market listing (details 
are skipped). Only the results for variable A2000, the security of persons and 
goods, are reported in detail here. The following regression has been fitted: 
 
Log Y = a + b.ENG +c.DUMTR d.DUMLDC (or LPCYPPP) + e.A2000 
where Y is the alternative series on financial development indicators such as 
BDY etc (average over the period 2001-2005). 
 
Table 4: Security of Persons and Goods, English Legal Origin and 
Financial Development, 2001-2005: Cross-Country Regression Analysis
 
 





BDY  BDY  PCRY   PCRY  PCRFY  PCRFY 
A2000  0.16**  0.37**  0.36**  0.48**  0.315**   0.46** 
ENG  0.164  0.34*  0.293  0.36  0 .384   0.45 
DUMTR  -0.377**  -0.72  -1.143**    -0.42  -1.264**   -0.49** 
DUMLDC  -0.217*  -  -1.014**  -  -1.089**  - 
LPCYPPP    0.07    0.09*    0.08 
a  0.116  -2.79**  -1.582**  -3.5**  -1.312**  -3.25** 
Adj.R
2         0.37  0.33  0.443  0.37   0.418  0.32 
 





MKPY  MKPY  VTRDY  VTRDY  TURN  TURN  LIST  LIST 
A2000   0.479*   0.59**  0.692*  1.05**  0.199  0.44**  0.606**   0.7 
ENG   -0.025   0.04  0 .059  0.1  0.117  0.09  0.138  0.13 
DUMTR  -
1.327** 
-1.02*  -2.221**  -1.01  -0.887*  0.03  -0.674  -0.13 
DUMLDC  -.492  -  -1.878**  -  -1.421**  -  -0.822*  - 
LPCYPPP  -  0.005  -  0.01  -  0.02  -  0.06 
a  -2.148*  -2.87**  -3.097*  -5.57**  -0.909  -2.77**  -13.056**  -
14.43 
Adj. R
2         0.26  0.27  0.295  0.21  0.251  0.1  0.254  0.22 
 
 
*  Significant at 5 percent level (based on robust SE).  
**  Significant at 1 percent level (based on robust SE).  
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As Table 4 shows, a significant relationship emerge for almost all the indicators 
of  financial  development  with  security  of  persons  and  goods,  A2000  -  the 
higher the security, the greater is the financial development.  This factor perhaps 
takes into account all other factors. 
 
We have also replaced the LDC dummy by per capita GDP (LPCYPPP) and 
find some changes in our findings: English legal origin countries have higher 
banking sector development (as measured by BDY) if we take into account the 
cross-country variations in the internal security of a country (A200) or its one 
crucial component, security of persons and goods (A2000) and GDP per capita 
(LPCYPPP). But in all these regressions, the coefficient of GDP per capita is 
not statistically significant. The question is how far the GDP per capita is a 
substitute for the LDC dummy. Some LDCs have high GDP per capita (because 
of say the oil price hike) but a less developed financial sector. Wherever we 
used LDC dummy, we got the expected result that LDCs tend to have lower 
financial  and  stock  market  development  compared  to  developed  countries. 
Taking this fact into account we observed that English legal origin countries do 
not have more dispersed share ownership and financial development. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The  present  paper  examines  the  essence  of  the  legal  origin  hypothesis 
propagated by the works of LLSV and their collaborators on the basis of a new 
dataset, the MINEFE-AFD dataset, which is not widely known especially in the 
English-speaking world. Apart from introducing this dataset, we contribute to 
the literature by examining the legal origin hypothesis on the basis of much 
wider coverage of countries and indicators of financial development. We used   
alternative  methodologies  –  simple  cross-country  OLS  regression  and 
logit/probit regressions especially suited for qualitative ordinal data. Due to data 
limitations, we could not go further in terms of methodological sophistication 
(using the latest tools of panel data analysis such as a vector decomposition 
fixed  effect  model  or  more  sophisticated  panel  cointegration  analysis). 
Nevertheless  the  present  study  may  have  some  importance  in  showing  the 
flimsy basis of the legal origin hypothesis.  
 
This study shows no evidence of more dispersed share ownership in the English 
law countries irrespective of whether we adjust for the existence of transitional 
economies and less developed countries present in the sample.  Using three 
indicators  of  development  of  banking  and  other  credit  institutions  and  four 
indicators  of  stock  market  developments,  we  find  no  evidence  of  higher 
financial development in the English law countries. As expected there is some 
evidence of lower financial development in the LDCs and transitional countries.   
   10 
It is not the English law heritage but the security of persons and goods which 
appears  to  explain  the  cross-country  variations  in  financial  development  – 
giving  some  support  to  the  hypothesis  of  Roe  and  Seigel  (2008).  So  future 
research may usefully study what determines the security of persons and goods 
in a world of ethnic, religious and many other forms of violent conflict that 
leads to the fragility of states and undermines economic development in many 




1 The Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Employment (MINEFE) of France 
developed the institutional database for its own economic policy purposes.  It 
opened up this data to the academic world by making it available online. The 
method  adopted  to  construct  the  indicators  is  described  in  Berthelier  et  al. 
(2003)  and  Meisel  et  al.  (2007).  The scope  of  this  database  covers  a  broad 
spectrum  of  these  institutional  characteristics:  functioning  of  political 
institutions,  public  security,  public  governance,  markets’  operating  freedom, 
stakeholder  co-ordination  and  strategic  vision  of  the  authorities  and  agents, 
security of transactions, market regulations and corporate governance, social 
dialogue, openness of society and markets and social cohesion. Kaufman et al. 
2008  used  this  database  in  their  recent  work  on  worldwide  governance 
indicators. 
2 It is based on the MINEFE list made available to me by Mr. Aoudia (presented 
in Appendix II). In the Appendix I, the English legal origin countries are 
marked by superscript e.   
3 Available from World Bank source (World Development Indicators 2006). 
   11 
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Appendix I: Internal Public Security, Share Ownership Patter And 
Financial Development Indicators 
 
Countries/ 
Variables  A200  B708  PCRY  PCRFY  BDY  MKPY  VTRDY  TURN  LIST 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Argentina  3.3  3  0.143  0.147  0.227  0.654  0.041  0.116  2.66 
Benin  3.2  2  0.125  0.125  0.167         
Burkina-Faso  3.7  2  0.128  0.128  0.134         
Bangladesh
e  2.8  3  0.265  0.265  0.324  0.035  0.014  0.42  1.80 
Bulgaria  3.4  3  0.243  0.243  0.314  0.077  0.02  0.227  45.30 
Bolivia  2.6  1  0.382  0.466  0.327  0.197  0.001  0.005  3.64 
Brazil  2.4  2  0.271  0.351  0.225  0.417  0.14  0.334  2.13 
Botswana
e  3.2  1  0.158  0.158  0.24  0.255  0.009  0.036  10.10 
Canada
e  4  4  0.69  0.994  0.62  1.023  0.637  0.624   
Chile  3.2  3  0.591  0.705  0.341  0.946  0.096  0.098  15.40 
China  3.3  3        0.356  0.302  0.85  1.00 
Côte d`Ivoire  1.5  1  0.143  0.143  0.144  0.118  0.002  0.015  2.18 
Cameroon  2.4  3  0.086  0.086  0.124         
Colombia  3.6  0  0.188  0.233  0.227  0.186  0.016  0.068  2.62 
Cuba  1.6  2              0.00 
Czech Republic  3.8  2  0.336  0.336  0.597  0.207  0.147  0.647  6.36 
Germany  4  3  1.147  1.147  0.95  0.457  0.595  1.311  8.38 
Dominican Republic  2.8  2  0.226  0.297  0.265         
Algeria  2.4  1  0.094  0.094  0.397         
Egypt  2.3  1  0.5  0.567  0.733  0.393  0.093  0.194  13.40 
Spain  2.6  2  1.095  1.095  0.824  0.766  1.291  1.696  67.80 
Estonia  3.4  4  0.31  0.31  0.314        10.80 
Ethiopia  2.6  3  0.192  0.228  0.358         
France  3.8  3  0.869  0.869  0.65  0.805  0.668  0.833  12.20 
Gabon  3.3  2  0.103  0.103  0.133         
United Kingdom
e  4  3  1.418  1.418  1.119  1.356  1.479  1.108  39.80 
Ghana
e  3.4  3  0.111  0.111  0.18  0.153  0.004  0.028  1.23 
Greece  3.8  1  0.663  0.663  0.81  0.63  0.249  0.396  30.20 
Guatemala  2.4  1  0.176  0.188  0.205  0.011  0.0003  0.029  0.63 
Hong Kong
e  3.6  3  1.485  1.485  2.362  4.042  1.959  0.476  148.33 
Hungary  4  3  0.387  0.387  0.389  0.217  0.126  0.566  4.84 
Indonesia  1.9  2  0.193  0.193  0.402  0.198  0.088  0.438  5.00 
India
e  2.4  2  0.316  0.316  0.495  0.388  0.499  1.397  1.53 
Ireland
e  3.5  3  1.163  1.163  0.775  0.591  0.271  0.474  14.50 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  2.4  1  0.227  0.314  0.307  0.165  0.037  0.203  5.55 
Israel
e  2.7  3  0.876  0.876  0.875  0.664  0.41  0.632  88.90 
Italy  3.4  1  0.804  0.804  0.514  0.458  0.508  1.129  4.85 
Jordan  3  1  0.714  0.72  0.957  1.138  0.563  0.372  33.40 
Japan  3.6  4  1.063  1.063  1.206  0.697  0.643  0.891  23.70 
Kazakhstan  3  2  0.198  0.198  0.144        3.45 
Kenya
e  2.7  1  0.237  0.252  0.311  0.182  0.014  0.064  1.58 
Cambodia  1.7  1  0.068  0.068  0.006         
Korea, Rep.  3.2  1  0.859  1.187  0.696  0.522  1.3  2.606  32.10   14 
Kuwait  3.7  3  0.521  0.609  0.661  0.965  0.834  0.835  43.00 
Lebanon  3.2  1        0.096  0.013  0.115  3.54 
Sri Lanka
e  2.3  3  0.279  0.279  0.334  0.13  0.03  0.222  12.50 
Lithuania  3.8  3  0.181  0.181  0.221  0.171  0.018  0.112  13.90 
Morocco  2.8  1  0.543  0.543  0.711  0.337  0.035  0.094  1.86 
Madagascar  2.7  1  0.084  0.084  0.149         
Mexico  2  2  0.148  0.166  0.236  0.209  0.055  0.261  1.58 
Mali  3.2  1  0.176  0.176  0.163         
Mozambique  3.1  1  0.036  0.036  0.223         
Mauritania  3  1  0.261  0.261  0.117        13.80 
Mauritius  3.4  1  0.562  0.562  0.787  0.319  0.019  0.061  33.20 
Malaysia
e  3.2  2  0.971  1.284  0.897  1.405  0.38  0.268  37.30 
Niger  3.3  1  0.058  0.058  0.074         
Nigeria
e  1  2  0.152  0.152  0.176  0.138  0.016  0.11  1.60 
Norway  3.8  3  0.737  0.983  0.501  0.438  0.422  0.931   
New Zealand
e  4  3  1.138  1.138  0.833  0.362  0.147  0.404  35.90 
Pakistan
e  1.9  1  0.233  0.233  0.315  0.186  0.678  3.5  4.69 
Peru  2.4  2  0.209  0.212  0.234  0.258  0.018  0.072  7.33 
Philippines  2.3  3  0.309  0.351  0.489  0.297  0.045  0.15  2.90 
Poland  3.4  3  0.266  0.266  0.349  0.187  0.055  0.278  5.87 
Portugal  3.6  2  1.378  1.378  0.876  0.403  0.199  0.49  6.27 
Romania  3  1  0.079  0.079  0.111  0.096  0.014  0.137  204.33 
Russian Federation  2.1  2  0.181  0.181  0.181  0.371  0.159  0.424  1.60 
Saudi Arabia  2.5  1  0.284  0.514  0.34  0.758  1.301  1.302  3.30 
Senegal  3.3  1  0.191  0.191  0.22         
Singapore
e  4  1  1.058  1.263  1.056  1.466  0.823  0.563  110.21 
Sweden  4  2  0.961  0.962  0.429  1.005  1.131  1.126  29.80 
Syria  3.6  1  0.078  0.078  0.441         
Taiwan  1.9  1        1.117  2.001  1.833   
Chad  3.6  1  0.035  0.035  0.041         
Thailand
e  2.3  2  0.757  0.974  0.85  0.521  0.511  1.016  6.98 
Tunisia  4  1  0.587  0.644  0.468  0.103  0.011  0.109  4.65 
Turkey  2.3  1  0.166  0.173  0.409  0.296  0.475  1.658  4.20 
Uganda
e  1.9  4  0.054  0.054  0.137  0.009  0  0.013  0.13 
Ukraine  3.2  1        0.104  0.004  0.057  3.51 
United States
e  1.7  1  0.435  2.088  0.601  1.297  2.023  1.552  19.00 
Uzbekistan  3.4  2        0.002  0.002  0.883  5.86 
Venezuela  2.3  2  0.095  0.1  0.149  0.049  0.002  0.05  2.22 
Vietnam  3.4  1  0.456  0.456  0.282  1.627  0.702  0.435   
South Africa
e  3  3        0.701  0.099  0.164   
Yemen
e  2.1  1  0.747  1.25  0.571  0.344  0.079  0.221  9.64 
Zimbabwe
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e  English legal origin countries. 
 
Data Definitions: 
(1)  A200: Internal public security, 2006 – it varies from 1 = low to 4 = high. 
(2)  B708: Dispersed share ownership, 2006 – it is 0 if the type of shareholder 
does not exist - if it exists, grade from 1=very low weight to 4=very high 
weight. 
(3)  PCRY: Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks / GDP, 2001-2005. 
(4)  PCRFT: Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions / GDP, 2001-2005. 
(5)  BDY: Bank Deposits / GDP, 2001-2005. 
(6)  MKPY: Stock Market Capitalization / GDP, 2001-2005. 
(7)  VTRDY: Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP, 2001-2005. 
(8)  TURN: Stock Market Turnover Ratio, 2001-2005. 
(9)  LIST: Listed Domestic Firms per Million Population, 2001-2005.  
 
Data Sources:  
Data presented in columns (1) and (2) are MINEFE-AFD project data. 
Data presented in columns (3) to (8) are calculated from World Financial 
Structure Dataset (World Bank data) 
Data presented in columns (9) are calculated from World Bank data on World 
Development Indicators, 2006.   16 
Appendix II: Legal Origin Information for 85 Countries 
 
  Source : CIA 
  Civil Law  Common Law  Others 








Isl  Communist  custom  Others 
Argentina  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0 
Benin  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Burkina Faso  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Bangladesh  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Bulgaria  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Bolivia  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Brazil  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Botswana  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Canada  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Chile  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
China  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
Côte d'Ivoire  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Cameroon  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Colombia  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Cuba  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  1 
Czech Republic  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Germany  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Dominican Rep  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Algeria  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Egypt  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1 
Spain  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Estonia  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Ethiopia  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
France  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Gabon  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
United Kingdom  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Ghana  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  1 
Greece  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Guatemala  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Hong Kong SAR  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Hungary  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Indonesia  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
India  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  1 
Ireland  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  1 
Iran Islamic Republic 
of  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Israel  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Italy  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Jordan  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Japan  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
Kazakhstan  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Kenya  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  1 
Cambodia  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  1 
Korea  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  1   17 
Kuwait  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Lebanon  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Sri Lanka  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1 
Lithuania  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Morocco  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Madagascar  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Mexico  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0 
Mali  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Mozambique  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Mauritania  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Mauritius  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Malaysia  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Niger  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Nigeria  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1 
Norway  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  1 
New Zealand  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Pakistan  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Peru  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Philippines  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
Poland  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
Portugal  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Romania  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
Russia  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Saudi Arabia  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Senegal  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Singapore  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Sweden  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Syrian Arab Republic  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Taiwan Province of 
China  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Chad  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1 
Thailand  1  0  0  0  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Tunisia  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1 
Turkey  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Uganda  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  1 
Ukraine  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
United States  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Uzbekistan  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
Venezuela  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Vietnam  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  1 
Yemen Republic of  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  1 
South Africa  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Zimbabwe  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0 
Total  51  8  7  5  2  65  29  5  32  15  7  21  38 
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Shleifer : Legal Structure and 
Judical Efficiency : the Lex 
Mundi Project - Oct 2001 
MINEFE SYNTHESE 
Countries  French 
Law 
Common 
Law  Other    Civil 
law 
Common 
law  Others 
Argentina  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Benin             1  0  0 
Burkina Faso             1  0  0 
Bangladesh             0  1  0 
Bulgaria             1  0  0 
Bolivia  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Brazil  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Botswana  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Canada  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Chile  1  0  0    1  0  0 
China  0  0  1    1  0  0 
Côte d'Ivoire  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Cameroon             1  0  0 
Colombia  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Cuba             1  0  0 
Czech Republic  0  0  1    1  0  0 
Germany  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Dominican Rep  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Algeria             1  0  0 
Egypt  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Spain  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Estonia  0  0  1    1  0  0 
Ethiopia             0  0  1 
France  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Gabon             1  0  0 
United Kingdom  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Ghana  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Greece  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Guatemala  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Hong Kong SAR  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Hungary  0  0  1    1  0  0 
Indonesia  1  0  0    1  0  0 
India  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Ireland  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Iran Islamic Republic 
of             0  0  1 
Israel  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Italy  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Jordan  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Japan  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Kazakhstan             1  0  0 
Kenya  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Cambodia             1  0  0 
Korea  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Kuwait  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Lebanon  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Sri Lanka             0  1  0 
Lithuania  0  0  1    1  0  0   19 
Morocco             1  0  0 
Madagascar             1  0  0 
Mexico  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Mali             1  0  0 
Mozambique  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Mauritania             1  0  0 
Mauritius             1  0  0 
Malaysia  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Niger             1  0  0 
Nigeria  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Norway  1  0  0    1  0  0 
New Zealand  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Pakistan  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Peru  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Philippines  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Poland  0  0  1    1  0  0 
Portugal  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Romania  0  0  1    1  0  0 
Russia  0  0  1    1  0  0 
Saudi Arabia             0  0  1 
Senegal  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Singapore  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Sweden  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Syrian Arab Republic             1  0  0 
Taiwan Province of 
China  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Chad             1  0  0 
Thailand  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Tunisia  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Turkey  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Uganda  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Ukraine  0  0  1    1  0  0 
United States  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Uzbekistan             0  0  1 
Venezuela  1  0  0    1  0  0 
Vietnam  0  0  1    1  0  0 
Yemen Republic of             0  1  0 
South Africa  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Zimbabwe  0  1  0    0  1  0 
Total  32  19  10    59  22  4 
 